����ֱ��

HEBRON: Shuhada Street stands as a stark testament to the transformation of the Palestinian city of Al-Khalil, the Arabic name for Hebron, since the signing of the Hebron Agreement between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization in January 1997. 

Once a bustling commercial center that reflected the city’s history as one of Palestine’s main economic hubs, the street is now largely closed. It has become a flashpoint for clashes between armed Jewish settlers, often accompanied and protected by the Israeli army, and local Palestinian residents. 

To understand what happened to Shuhada Street — the name of which translates to “Martyrs Street,” in honor of the many Palestinians killed there over the years, particularly during the 1994 Ibrahimi Mosque massacre — one must first understand the Hebron Agreement. 

It was part of the Oslo peace process, which began with the signing of the Oslo I Accord in 1993. More specifically, the Hebron agreement implemented the Oslo II Accord, which was signed in September 1995. 

By 1996, however, the political atmosphere in Israel had shifted dramatically with the election of Benjamin Netanyahu of the Likud Party as prime minister. The initial optimism surrounding the US-sponsored Oslo Accords quickly faded, as Netanyahu had campaigned on a platform that rejected the framework for the accords. 

American pressure is often cited as the primary reason why Netanyahu ultimately accepted the Hebron Agreement, or the additional protocol to Oslo II. However, in doing so the hardline Israeli leader succeeded in fundamentally altering previous understandings regarding Israel’s withdrawal from the city. 

Renowned Palestinian intellectual Edward Said, who died in 2003, described the agreement as “bizarre mathematics” and a “schizophrenic scenario” in which Palestinian supporters of the PLO celebrated their own confinement. His critique calls for an examination of the agreement’s lopsided terms. 

It divided Hebron into two main regions. H-1, constituting nearly 80 percent of the city, was allocated to 160,000 native Palestinians, who were granted limited municipal control over these areas. H-2, the remaining 20 percent, was allocated to 450 armed Jewish settlers, protected by thousands of Israeli soldiers, who retained total security control over the entire city. 

In essence, Jewish residents, estimated to account for 0.3 percent of Hebron’s total population, enjoyed supremacy, extensive military protection, religious rights, freedom of movement, and little in the way of accountability for any acts of violence.  

Palestinians were assured by their leadership that the protocol was a temporary arrangement but continue to suffer the consequences of this political misstep to this day. Hebron’s population has grown significantly during the intervening years, reaching about 250,000 people, yet its residents remain hostages to the security whims of approximately 800 settlers. 

While it was widely believed at the time that Netanyahu had made “concessions” to the Palestinians by accepting an unpopular agreement despite opposition from his right-wing base, it was really PLO leader Yasser Arafat who faced immense pressure, from Washington. Dennis Ross, the US envoy to the Middle East at the time, played a key role in exerting this pressure. 

Arafat, whose Palestinian Authority, which was established in 1994, relied heavily on US support, both as the convener of donor country meetings and the political guarantor of the Oslo Accords, found himself in a difficult position. 

The Palestinian understanding of the Hebron Agreement was that it represented a step in a larger political process guided by the principle of “land for peace.” However, Netanyahu, who would undermine the substance of the Oslo Accords and the broader peace process in the years that followed, rejected this formula.  

As Edward Said observed: “The United States … placed Arafat under impossible pressure. Israel’s political concerns, its exaggerated obsessions with security and terror, and the notion that one armed settler deserved more consideration than thousands of Palestinians all were adopted by the US middlemen.” 

The notion of “separate but equal” — a legal doctrine originating from the US Supreme Court during the late 19th century to justify racial segregation — pales in comparison to the reality in Hebron. There, Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs are not only separate but profoundly unequal, despite the latter constituting the overwhelming majority of the population. This inequality is enforced by a heavily armed settler population and pervasive Israeli military presence. 

In recent years, the conditions under which Palestinians in Hebron and across the West Bank are living have worsened. The Israeli military no longer abides by the original agreements, in Hebron or anywhere else in the West Bank, which was divided into several zones under Oslo II. 

These zones, known as Areas A, B and C, were theoretically governed by separate military and security arrangements but, in practice, Israel has maintained overarching control. 

The Hebron Agreement remains one of the most glaring examples of the failure of the Oslo peace process. Far from fostering peace, it entrenched the existing colonial paradigm, reinforcing both the occupation and the expansion of illegal settlements. 

Shuhada Street, once a symbol of Hebron’s vibrant commercial life, now stands as a haunting reminder of Palestinian dispossession and the enduring legacy of a flawed agreement. 

• Dr. Ramzy Baroud is a journalist, author of six books and the editor of The Palestine Chronicle. He is a nonresident senior research fellow at the Center for Islam and Global Affairs.