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Can a country, no matter how large, contain two armies, two authorities and two “states?” Is obligatory coexistence just a form of truce until one army succeeds in defeating the other? Is a clash between the two armies, two authorities and two states inevitable because the factions are impeding countries from heading toward a time of stability and investment? Have the countries grown weary of factions and decided to return to a time of normal states after paying a heavy price during the time of militias? The time of the factions did not succeed in deterring the savagery of Benjamin Netanyahu’s army.

It all began during a meeting at a Beirut apartment between Iranian and Lebanese activists in the wake of the success of Ayatollah Khomeini’s revolution. The focus was on how to fortify the regime of the revolution against potential dangers. The gatherers believed that the ouster of Mohammed Mosaddegh’s government in 1953 was a strong example of why regular armies should not be trusted. They believed that such armies tended to pounce whenever they sensed an impending revolution or whiff of change. They also believed that armies were a possible source of danger because they could be infiltrated by Western intelligence services.

The gatherers were therefore in agreement on the need to come up with a force that would prevent a segment of the Iranian army from rising up against the Khomeinist revolution. Anis Al-Naqqash claimed that he was the first to propose the idea of forming the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps.

The Iranian model would be replicated in other countries in the region as part of the “Axis of Resistance” project. Following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, and with then-Syrian President Hafez Assad’s approval, Khomeini formed Hezbollah in Lebanon as the first tangible implementation of Iran’s policy of “exporting the revolution” that is enshrined in its constitution.

Iran would go on to transform southern Lebanon into an Iranian-Israeli front, when it had previously served as a Palestinian-Israeli one. As it clashed with Israel over the years, Hezbollah gained a halo of sorts, transforming into its own army and statelet. Despite Lebanon’s diverse composition, Hezbollah became the country’s sole decision-maker that had the final say over presidents and governments. 

Khomeini formed Hezbollah in Lebanon as the first tangible implementation of Iran’s policy of ‘exporting the revolution.’

Ghassan Charbel

It even took away from the government one of its most important powers: the decision of war and peace. Hezbollah never consulted anyone when it embarked on its mission to save Bashar Assad’s regime with Iran and Russia’s backing. It never consulted anyone when it opened its “support front” in solidarity with Gaza following the Oct. 7, 2023, Al-Aqsa Flood Operation.

The Syrian army, meanwhile, overestimated its own strength before realizing it would be unable to save the Assad regime. So, it turned to pro-Iran militias and Russian air power. Iran would also reap another success, this time in Iraq, where Gen. Qassem Soleimani would turn Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani’s fatwa to take part in the fight against Daesh into an opportunity to form a parallel army called the Popular Mobilization Forces. Of course, we cannot deny the role of the PMF in fighting Daesh, but recent developments in Iraq are demonstrating the difficulty of having two armies coexisting in one map.

We can add to the above the Houthi coup in Yemen, which completed the Axis of Resistance, marking an unprecedented success for Iran. It managed to not only surround Israel, but also some other countries in the region. It established a group of armies to serve as its proxies and keep danger away from its own territory. Iran possessed decisive cards in four countries that it could leverage in any serious negotiations with the US.

Building the Axis of Resistance demanded billions of dollars and meddling in the internal affairs of other countries. It built massive tunnel networks, set up weapons smuggling routes and carried out attacks, bombings and assassinations. With the axis all set up, Iran appeared to be the Middle East’s most powerful player.

However, the axis would eventually break apart due to three factors: Israel’s military superiority on various fronts, the assassination of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, and the toppling of the Assad regime in Syria. 

Recent developments in Iraq are demonstrating the difficulty of having two armies coexisting in one map.

Ghassan Charbel

Iran has so far refused to acknowledge the new reality in the region, even after the war reached its own skies and claimed the lives of its generals and scientists. It is having a hard time admitting that Yahya Sinwar’s Al-Aqsa Flood Operation turned into a calamity for the Axis of Resistance. The axis lost Syria — its most significant link — and Hezbollah, with its ability to fight or deter Israel. Iran lost its ability to attack Israel from the territory of its Arab neighbors.

To add to that, the governments in Baghdad, Damascus and Beirut are all demanding that the state has a monopoly over arms, while demanding roadmaps that are safeguarded by constitutions and regular armies, not the factions. Given its past experiences, Baghdad has concluded that it cannot speak of stability, prosperity and investment if drones operated by the “private sector” can attack radars or oil fields or if members of the PMF can “punish” the state’s own security forces. The parliament’s confusion over how to deal with the PMF law does not stem just from the US’ opposition to it.

Meanwhile, remarks by an adviser to the Iranian supreme leader, Ali Akbar Velayati, reflect just how much Tehran refuses to acknowledge and work with the changes that have taken place in the region. He rejected the Lebanese government’s decision to disarm all factions, including Hezbollah, disregarding Lebanon’s drive toward wanting to once again become a normal state that makes its own decisions through its institutions. Velayati also said the PMF in Iraq was playing the same role Hezbollah played in Lebanon.

In a remarkable development that reflects the extent of the changes in the region, the Lebanese Foreign Ministry condemned Velayati’s statements as blatant interference in Lebanese internal affairs.

The Iraqi, Syrian and Lebanese people are dreaming of the establishment of their own normal states. The factions are not the sole cause of instability in the region, but their presence is preventing countries from consolidating their institutions, fighting corruption and carrying out development plans. Armed factions weaken states and waste the most important revolution any country can possess — that of stability under the rule of law. The factions’ insistence on holding on to their arsenals means that difficult days are ahead. Rejecting a normal state means the factions will pour fuel on the fire of regional maps.

• Ghassan Charbel is editor-in-chief of Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper. 
X: @GhasanCharbel 

This article first appeared in Asharq Al-Awsat.