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Ankara’s recent outreach to Libya’s Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar and the Tobruk-based administration controlled by him has overturned several existing regional alignments, while aggravating maritime tensions between Greece and Turkiye. It has thus ignited the revival of long-standing rivalries, which are being demonstrated through fresh strategic competition in the waters of the Mediterranean.
Soon after the fall of Muammar Qaddafi in 2011, Libya plunged into civil conflict, leading to the formation of two rival administrations — one at Tripoli, now called the Government of National Unity, and the other at Tobruk in the east, administered by the House of Representatives but buoyed by the Libyan National Army headed by Haftar. The latter was supported by Egypt and the UAE, while the Tripoli administration received the backing of Turkiye.
In 2019, Turkiye was rewarded by Tripoli for its military support with a maritime agreement that linked Libyan and Turkish exclusive economic zones, while significantly expanding their maritime claims in the gas-rich Eastern Mediterranean. These claims encroached on the traditional claims of Greece and Cyprus, which responded by setting up the East Mediterranean Gas Forum in partnership with Egypt, which later included Israel, the Palestine Authority, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Italy and France. Turkiye followed up its claims by deploying survey and drilling ships, supported by naval vessels, in some disputed areas.
These disputes over gas resources flow from a longer history of discord between Turkiye and Greece dating to the First World War, including unresolved issues relating to maritime boundaries and sovereignty. Thus, the Turkiye-Libya agreement reflected Ankara’s “Blue Homeland” doctrine, shaped by influential naval strategists, which requires it to robustly assert and defend its claims to maritime boundaries and resources to safeguard its security and economic interests.
However, the rivalries in the Eastern Mediterranean have been impacted by recent changes in regional relationships. From 2021, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan began a process of engagement with ����ֱ��, the UAE and Egypt. He visited Cairo for the first time since 2012. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi paid a return visit seven months later, initiating a major boost to political, military and economic ties.
This bonhomie cleared the ground for Turkiye to reach out to Haftar and other members of the Tobruk administration. Haftar’s son, Saddam Haftar, the commander of the army’s ground forces, visited Ankara in April, followed by a second visit in June.
Turkiye’s principal interest is to get the Tobruk-based House of Representatives to ratify the maritime agreement concluded with Tripoli in 2019. This will give the agreement greater legitimacy, strengthen Turkish claims in the Eastern Mediterranean and dilute Greece’s claims, which have so far enjoyed backing from Tobruk.
This has set the stage for hectic regional diplomatic activity, as the rivals seek to outmaneuver each other in the high-stakes power play in the Mediterranean. 

The Turkiye-Greece rivalry has made the EU a divided house at a time when it should be capable of decisive action.

Talmiz Ahmad

Both the Greek foreign minister and the Turkish intelligence chief have visited Haftar, who has himself sought the enhancement of his military capacities by the EU. In return, he has pledged efforts to curtail illegal migration to Europe. In July, Turkiye signed a new military agreement with the Tripoli administration, signaling that Ankara’s eastward interactions have not diluted its traditional links with Tripoli.
There have been diplomatic interactions outside Libya as well. After the 2024 exchange of visits, Turkish-Egyptian ties have flourished. Bilateral trade has reached $15 billion, a high-level strategic cooperation council has been set up and Turkiye is supplying drones for the Egyptian armed forces. About 200 Turkish companies are working in Egypt, with investments of $3 billion. Last month, the two countries conducted their first joint sea and air exercises in 13 years. They will also work together on the development of the KAAN stealth fighter jet to replace America’s F-35, from which Turkiye has been excluded.
Turkiye has also been keen to deepen ties with Italy to counterbalance Greece, while Rome has sought Turkish support to prevent illegal migration from Libya. Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni visited Turkiye in August, meeting with Erdogan and Libya’s Tripoli-based Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh. Turkiye and Italy are also cooperating in drone manufacture and aviation.
But Turkish diplomacy continues to face serious challenges. European affairs scholar Dimitar Bechev has said that its ambitions are not just confined to the Middle East and North Africa, as it also wishes to reset ties with Europe. This is confirmed by its active role in European conclaves, particularly those dealing with Ukraine, even as it maintains close ties with Russia. However, the Turkiye-Greece rivalry in the Eastern Mediterranean has made the EU a divided house at a time when it should be capable of decisive action amid the uncertainties plaguing the global diplomatic scene.
Again, Libya itself remains mired in confrontations. While Turkiye is following a dual-track approach of engaging with both Tripoli and Tobruk, there are no signs that the divide between the two administrations is narrowing. However, through pragmatic working arrangements, oil exports are taking place and the central bank continues to manage the country’s resources.
Turkiye pays lip service to the idea of “one Libya” but has exerted little effort to promote national unity. Unless the country is brought together under a single credible authority, Ankara may find that its impressive diplomatic achievements are illusory.

• Talmiz Ahmad is a former Indian diplomat.