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As dozens of world leaders descended on New York for the annual UN General Assembly High-Level Week, hundreds of meetings took place across the city among presidents, prime ministers, ministers and senior officials. These encounters ranged from carefully choreographed bilateral sessions to informal conversations on the margins of the world’s biggest diplomatic gathering. Yet one meeting was notably absent this year compared to previous UNGA gatherings: the C5+1.

This grouping — made up of the five Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan, plus the US — has convened in this format every year since its inception in 2015. This year is the 10th anniversary of the founding of America’s primary diplomatic platform for engaging with the Central Asian states, which makes the absence of a gathering all the more notable.

For most of the past decade, the US secretary of state has met with his Central Asian counterparts on the sidelines of the UNGA. On a few occasions, the meeting has taken place inside the region itself and in 2020 and 2021 it was conducted virtually because of the pandemic. But never since the format was created has a year passed without a C5+1 meeting.

This year’s silence is puzzling, especially considering that the Trump administration has, in recent months, taken steps to deepen US engagement with Central Asia. In fact, it has been moving toward the outlines of a regional policy, even if some of those steps appear to have been unplanned or accidental.

There is still no C5+1 meeting on the calendar for 2025, despite the symbolic importance of the 10th anniversary

Luke Coffey

Take, for example, President Donald Trump’s announcements on the eve of the UN assembly, in which he revealed two very large business deals with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Kazakhstan will spend $4 billion over the next decade to purchase American-made locomotives for its rail network — the largest deal of its kind ever signed with the US. Uzbekistan, meanwhile, will spend billions on Boeing aircraft for its national airliner. These large-scale business deals are the type of transactional diplomacy that Trump likes, while they also have the effect of binding the region more closely to the US.

Other actions taken by the Trump administration, whether by design or by default, could also form the foundation of a serious American strategy for Central Asia. One of the most striking examples is Trump’s effort to bring peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan. This peace will lead to the creation of the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity,” a new trade and transit corridor that will ultimately help to connect Turkiye to Central Asia through Armenia and Azerbaijan. This route will add resilience to the existing corridor that runs through Georgia and Azerbaijan and could significantly enhance America’s logistical connections to Central Asian markets.

Without Turkiye — America’s NATO ally — Washington would struggle to access the region at all. Central Asia is landlocked and largely encircled: Russia to the north, China to the east and Iran and Afghanistan to the south. The only realistic path for American goods, services and influence lies to the west, via the South Caucasus.

Another notable element has been Trump’s public comments about reestablishing a US military presence at Bagram Airfield in Afghanistan. Few locations in the world are as strategic as Bagram. Located in the heart of Eurasia, it offers a vantage point over Central Asia, South Asia and even parts of the Middle East. It was a major folly for the US to abandon the base during its disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan. Whether Trump can find a way to return American forces to Bagram remains to be seen. But if he succeeds, the move would almost certainly be privately welcomed in Central Asian capitals.

Since gaining independence in the 1990s, the Central Asian states have proven to be useful partners for Washington

Luke Coffey

Still, even as high-profile business deals are signed, new transport corridors are envisioned and speculation grows about a US return to Afghanistan, some fundamentals of a coherent American approach to Central Asia remain untouched.

First, there is still no C5+1 meeting on the calendar for 2025, despite the symbolic importance of the 10th anniversary. Second, the US should be preparing to release a new Central Asia strategy this year. The last such strategy was unveiled in February 2020 during Trump’s first term and Washington has traditionally updated its regional strategy every five years. Yet, just as with the missing C5+1 meeting, there is no sign of progress on this front either.

For the US, engaging with Central Asia makes perfect sense. The region is rich in natural resources, including oil, natural gas and the rare earth minerals that have been a priority for the Trump administration. The Central Asian states, almost by necessity, pursue balancing strategies in foreign policy, looking for external partners to offset the overwhelming influence of Russia and China. Since gaining independence after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, they have also proven to be useful partners for Washington, cooperating on counterterrorism, energy security and regional stability.

Yet, despite this track record, no sitting US president has ever visited Central Asia. That absence speaks volumes and highlights how much more could be done. A presidential visit to the region, timed to coincide with a heads of state-level C5+1 gathering, would send a strong signal of American commitment. Coupling such a visit with the publication of a comprehensive new Central Asia strategy would give Washington a more coherent approach and would reassure local partners that America’s engagement is serious and sustained.

Central Asia’s importance will only grow in the coming years. Its geography places it at the crossroads of Eurasia, while its politics and resources make it a zone of competition among great powers, whether its leaders like it or not. If America intends to manage its global interests in an era of great power rivalry, Central Asia cannot be ignored.

• Luke Coffey is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute. X: @LukeDCoffey