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There is no doubt that US President Donald Trump’s recent peace initiative between Armenia and Azerbaijan was a historic accomplishment. He deserves full credit for helping to bring an end to one of the most intractable conflicts in the post-Soviet space. The forthcoming normalization between the two countries has the potential to usher in a new era of economic prosperity and stability in the South Caucasus. Long-closed transport links can be reopened and Armenia will finally be able to participate in regional infrastructure and energy projects from which it has long been excluded.
At first glance, much of the commentary surrounding this agreement suggests that the South Caucasus has finally turned a corner toward peace and stability. But this impression is misleading. While the Armenia-Azerbaijan dispute may be moving toward resolution, unfinished business remains elsewhere in the region. Georgia — a small country situated between Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkey and Russia — remains deeply vulnerable. According to reports, Russia continues to occupy roughly 20 percent of Georgia’s internationally recognized territory: the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. These frozen conflicts have persisted for decades and remain a flashpoint for potential instability.
The roots of the problem stretch back to the early 1990s when the Soviet Union was collapsing. Like other Soviet republics at the time, Georgia declared independence. Within the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic, however, both Abkhazia and South Ossetia enjoyed a measure of autonomy, owing in part to their distinct ethnic compositions. As central authority crumbled, ethnic nationalists in both regions illegally sought to secede from the newly independent Georgian state. The result was bloody conflict. Tens of thousands were killed and hundreds of thousands of ethnic Georgians were displaced from their homes.
By the mid-1990s a fragile peace was established. Russian and Georgian peacekeepers, along with international observers from the UN and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, were deployed to maintain stability. For a time the situation seemed contained. Yet, beneath the surface Russia was taking increasingly provocative steps: issuing Russian passports to residents of the territories, backing local militias and supporting separatist political structures.

One frozen conflict may be on its way to resolution, but another continues to be largely ignored.

Luke Coffey

The situation boiled over in August 2008. As the world watched the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics, Russian forces surged through the Roki Tunnel in the Caucasus Mountains, launching a large-scale invasion of Georgia. Within days Russian troops were just 30 km from Tbilisi, Georgia’s capital. After five days of fighting, a ceasefire was brokered by then French President Nicolas Sarkozy. The resulting six-point plan halted the fighting but it failed to resolve the underlying dispute.
Russia quickly consolidated its gains. Weeks after the war Moscow unilaterally recognized both Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states and stationed thousands of troops there permanently. Locals live under tight restrictions, with movement across the administrative boundary lines often dangerous or impossible. Many residents were given Russian passports, binding them more closely to Moscow.
Fifteen years on and Russia is reported to have violated key elements of the ceasefire. The agreement stipulated that Russian forces would withdraw to the positions they held before Aug. 6, 2008. This never happened. Moscow also pledged to allow humanitarian access, yet international monitors from the EU are barred from entering Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Driving just a couple of hours outside Tbilisi one can see the human cost of these frozen conflicts. Settlements dot the countryside housing tens of thousands of internally displaced people — ethnic Georgians forced from their homes in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Many of these communities, established hastily in the wake of war, remain a stark reminder that the conflicts are not only about borders on a map but about lives and families permanently uprooted.
The fighting has not resumed but the risk of renewed conflict cannot be dismissed. The current Georgian government is broadly aligned with Moscow’s interests but faces growing opposition at home. Large street demonstrations have called for a more pro-Western course. Given Russia’s willingness to intervene militarily in Belarus in 2020 and in Kazakhstan in 2022 to prop up governments, it is not inconceivable that Moscow would do the same in Georgia.
This matters for reasons that go well beyond Georgia’s sovereignty. The South Caucasus is a vital corridor linking Europe and Asia. Critical pipelines, highways and railways pass through Georgia — often within striking distance of the occupied areas. The Baku-Supsa oil pipeline runs through South Ossetia. The Southern Gas Corridor, which brings Caspian gas to European markets, relies on Georgia as a secure transit state. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, one of the most important routes delivering oil from the Caspian to international markets, also passes through Georgia. The Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway, the region’s key east-west rail link, runs close to Russian-occupied territory. Any renewed conflict would jeopardize these arteries of energy and trade, with consequences felt far beyond the Caucasus.
This is why the apparent calm in Georgia should not lull policymakers into complacency. While the Trump administration’s success in brokering peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan deserves recognition, the reality is that the South Caucasus remains fragile. One frozen conflict may be on its way to resolution, but another — just as dangerous — continues to be largely ignored.
President Trump has shown that progress is possible in this difficult region. Building on that momentum means not only celebrating the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace but also confronting the unresolved conflicts that still hang over the South Caucasus and beyond.

• Luke Coffey is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute. X: @LukeDCoffey