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As befits 21st century diplomacy, US President Donald Trump announced a complete and total ceasefire between Iran and Israel on social media, congratulating “everyone” for this, especially himself. After regrettable violations within the first few hours of the truce, which needlessly caused more loss of life, the deal to end this 12-day war seems to be holding. It is probably the first good news for the region in months, as both sworn enemies have given way to pressure exerted by Washington and are holding fire, at least for now.
Until the ceasefire was agreed there was a danger the region might become embroiled in a long war of attrition. Now that the missile and drone exchanges have ended, one inevitable question is whether this costly affair could have been prevented — not just as a hypothetical exercise, but as a lesson in how to avoid another military confrontation between two of the most powerful militaries in the region. Could diplomacy have achieved the same, or even better, results, without inflicting death, destruction, and psychological scars on both combatants?
The build-up to these 12 days of hostilities began more than a quarter of the century ago, and some might argue as far back as 1979 when the Iranian revolution rather artificially marked Israel, for its close relations with both the toppled shah and the US, as an enemy. History will look back at this deep enmity and might struggle to find objective reasons for it. Initially this hostility served the revolution as a tool for consolidating its hold on power at home and suppressing opposition. In turn, it also helped to propel Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to power as Israel’s defender against the Iranian threat, both conventional and potentially nuclear.
Time will possibly reveal how close Iran was to assembling a nuclear bomb, and most analysts agree that the US decision to withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action nuclear deal in 2018, during Trump’s first term, removed the shackles from Iran’s uranium enrichment program, bringing it closer to weapons grade. It is hardly believable that the Tehran regime should have invested such huge resources only for civilian use. It is also the case that in forming and leading the so-called axis of resistance, Iran, through its proxies in the region, posed a threat to stability sufficient to eventually merit a response. Ultimately, despite being a source of major disruption, even a lethal one in the case of Hamas, and to a lesser extent Hezbollah, it could not match Israel’s military capabilities, especially when the latter was backed by the US and other allies.
On this occasion, Netanyahu managed also to lure Trump to act against his instincts and use military force. For the US leader the dilemma was between maintaining his posture as a president who brings an end to wars, and the temptation to deliver an almost risk-free strike against Iran’s main nuclear sites after Israel’s air force had eliminated the country’s air defense capabilities.
Could diplomacy have achieved the same, or even better, results?
Yossi Mekelberg
The latter then gained the upper hand, enabling Trump, in a matter of days, to potentially inflict a decisive blow against Iran’s nuclear program, especially in Fordow, where it is believed more than 400 kg of uranium enriched to 60 percent was stored, and then lean on both sides to stop the hostilities. When both violated the ceasefire, Trump was furious, telling the media in no uncertain terms that “we basically have two countries that have been fighting so long and so hard that they don’t know what ... they’re doing.” Yet, his criticism of Israel was far more robust, including a demand that Netanyahu order its pilots to return from another mission immediately.
Allowing Iran a symbolic attack on US military bases in Qatar without any loss of life permitted an act of theater that allowed Tehran to save face after weeks of humiliation during which it lost many of its military chiefs and top scientists, exposing the level of Israel’s penetration to nearly every government department, scientific institution, and military command. Nevertheless, Israel’s vulnerability was also exposed by its failure to sufficiently protect its civilian population, revealing a severe shortage of adequate shelters as their enemy hit hospitals, the main international airport, and even oil refineries in Haifa.
What emerged quickly was the difference between the open-ended conflict that Israel embarked on and Washington’s priorities. Israel had many far-reaching objectives beyond Iran’s nuclear program, including degrading its conventional military power, and instigating regime change. For Trump, however, it was simply about setting back the nuclear program and returning to the negotiating table.
The war with Iran gave Netanyahu a new lease of life. A man who had barely talked to the Israeli media or mixed with people in public, especially since Oct. 7, suddenly could not stop himself from doing both, including visiting sites that were hit by Iranian missiles. But 21 months after the massacre, incapable and unwilling to take responsibility, he still has not visited the communities that were destroyed there. Yet the destruction caused by Iran gave him much-needed justification to continue the war before Trump put a stop to the conflict, and the photo-ops were exactly what he needed considering his high level of disapproval among voters.
After this brief bout of fighting, Netanyahu’s Likud party is doing slightly better in the polls, which might tempt him to call a snap election, but in the meantime, he will have to convince Israel’s voters that the outcome of this war justified the unprecedented terrifying 12 days that they endured. Can he, together with Trump, also translate military achievements into a diplomatic success, one that ensures both that future uranium enrichment is limited to what is needed for civil use, and that Tehran ceases its meddling in the affairs of other countries? This remains an open question, but the next task for Israel’s prime minister is to explain to the electorate why the war in Gaza is still raging and 50 hostages are still in captivity.
- Yossi Mekelberg is a professor of international relations and an associate fellow of the MENA Program at Chatham House. X: @YMekelberg